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Abstract In medical education, we assess knowledge,
skills, and a third category usually called values or
attitudes. While knowledge and skills can be as-
sessed, this third category consists of ‘beetles’, after
the philosopher Wittgenstein’s beetle-in-a-box anal-
ogy. The analogy demonstrates that private experi-
ences such as pain and hunger are inaccessible to the
public, and that we cannot know whether we all expe-
rience them in the same way. In this paper, we claim
that unlike knowledge and skills, private experiences
of medical learners cannot be objectively measured,
assessed, or directly accessed in any way. If we try
to do this anyway, we risk reducing them to knowl-
edge and skills—thereby making curriculum design
choices based on what can be measured rather than
what is valuable education, and rewarding zombie-
like student behaviour rather than authentic devel-
opment. We conclude that we should no longer use
the model of representation to assess attitudes, emo-
tions, empathy, and other beetles. This amounts to,
first of all, shutting the door on objective assessment
and investing in professional subjective assessment.
Second, changing the way we define ‘fuzzy concepts’
in medical education, and stimulating conversations
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about ambiguous terms. Third, we should reframe
the way we think of competences and realize only
part of professional development lies within our con-
trol. Most importantly, we should stop attempting to
measure the unmeasurable, as it might have negative
consequences.
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Introduction
Suppose every medical student had a box with
something in it: we call it ‘empathy’. No one can
look into anyone else’s box, and all students say
they know what empathy is only by looking at
their own experience of empathy.—Here it would
be quite possible for everyone to have something
different in their box. One might even imagine
such a thing constantly changing.
We could replace the word ‘empathy’ in this quote
by ‘integrity’, ‘reflection’, or ‘professional identity for-
mation’—these are terms that have found their way
into our common medical educational language yet
are intensely personal and private for learners. We
will call them ‘beetles’, after the thought experiment
by Ludwig Wittgenstein:
Suppose everyone had a box with something in it:
we call it a ‘beetle’. No one can look into anyone
else’s box, and everyone says he knows what a bee-
tle is only by looking at his beetle.—Here it would
be quite possible for everyone to have something
different in their box. One might even imagine
such a thing constantly changing [1].
In the beetle-in-a-box analogy, the beetle stands for
private, personal experiences. We can never know if
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other people experience empathy or pain in the same
way, because we can never take our own inner expe-
riences out of the ‘box’, and compare them.
We shall follow this fundamental idea through, be-
fore considering ways to deal with beetles in medical
education. The meanings of words that refer to pri-
vate experiences (‘pain’, ‘sadness’) are not to be found
in a mental image. The less we can point to something
(‘THIS is what I mean when I say ‘chair”), the more
complex it is to define. It is difficult to find words for
our own private experiences, but it is impossible to do
so for someone else’s inner world. However, medical
education has recently shownmore interest in the per-
sonal and emotional side of medicine, and has thereby
introduced such fuzzy concepts [2] as empathy, pro-
fessional identity development, and reflection. These
are beetles in the individual’s box, carried through the
student years and the subsequent career.
For our purposes, the core of the beetle problem is
that while we know private experiences exist and mat-
ter for developing into a competent healthcare profes-
sional, we cannot observe, measure, or share them,
because there is no external referent that both par-
ties can point to. This means it is hard to incorporate
beetles into the medical curriculum, in which assess-
ment requires demonstration and observation, where
the assumption is that what we observe is a represen-
tation of the ‘real thing’. A skill can be demonstrated,
knowledge can be demonstrated. Beetles cannot.
In medical education, however, we often act as if
medical students are able to open up their boxes and
produce the contents for assessment purposes. Edu-
cators, in turn, are expected to assess medical stu-
dents’ levels of empathy [3] or the quality of their
reflection [4]. To this end, medical trainees are in-
creasingly asked to ‘share’ private experiences in the
medical curriculum. But what if this is fundamentally
impossible?
We do not know how to deal with beetles-in-boxes.
At the same time, we acknowledge that at this point in
the young science of competency-based medical edu-
cation we are still ‘in the midst of a transition in which
we cannot remain standing ’ [5]. So let us first look at
the way in which phenomena beyond knowledge and
skills entered medical schools.
How beetles entered medical curricula
There is no exact moment when beetles, different an-
imals from knowledge and skills, entered formal cur-
ricula. We hypothesize that two main developments
played a role.
First, the focus on the safety and care of the pa-
tient. A focus on the lay rather than the professional
has been with us for a century, in Dewey for general
education [6], and in Osler for medicine passim [7].
From the 1970s [8] onwards, there have been increas-
ing calls for humanized medicine, with its emphasis
on the patient as well as the disease [9]. A major impe-
tus in the UKwas the response to the tragedy at Bristol
Royal Infirmary, where there were serious problems
in paediatric cardiac surgery. Kennedy spoke of the
need to ‘broaden the notion of competence’, to in-
clude such things as communication, team-work and
the like [10]. Human factors and patient-centredness
became important aspects of healthcare [11, 12].
Second, the movement toward outcome-based ed-
ucation, and consequently the burgeoning use of the
OSCE approach offered itself explicitly as an objec-
tive way of assessing competence [13–17]. Insights
from educational sciences were used as an inspira-
tion and ‘a detailed analysis of the characteristics and
qualifications of the modern physician was deemed
necessary, in terms of skills, personality traits, social
and economic problems, and responsibility as a citi-
zen’ [13]. Taking guidance from ‘functions required for
the practice of medicine in a specified setting’, doors
opened for new and previously unexplored themes in
medical education. The famous CanMeds roles can be
seen as an offshoot of this development, as they are in
part a response to changes that patients and society
required from doctors. Among the CanMeds roles we
find ‘professional’, ‘communicator’, and ‘collaborator’
[18].
In grappling with CanMeds roles, many strange
guests entered the formal curriculum: integrity, pro-
fessionalism, empathy, reflection, a caring attitude,
and so on. These new concepts had to comply with
some of the demands of their new home: beetles were
immediately clearly defined to be measurable and as-
sessable—as is customary in systems under scrutiny
of accreditation bodies. This demand for conceptual
clarity was quickly satisfied, transforming a beetle-like
empathy into an ‘achievement’ or ‘performance’, a set
of behaviours that can be taught and demonstrated,
and therefore assessed and measured. However, the
attempt to find a uniform definition hinges on the
assumption that when we are using the same word,
we mean the same thing.
Beetles were added to the curriculum to make
medicine more human, which is an endeavour we
applaud. But the cost has been to reduce them to
knowledge and behaviours. When empathy becomes
a skill or a performance, it ceases to be empathy.
The moment reflection becomes a tick-box exercise,
it ceases to be authentic reflection [19]. This paper
explores the problems we encounter in dealing with
beetles in medical education, and how to move for-
ward. So first, we will focus on the complexity of
beetles.
The complexity of beetles
Wittgenstein’s beetle-in-a-box thought experiment
deals principally with sensations, but the argument
can be extended, as we do in this paper. Wittgenstein
deals in particular with the question of pain. Is my
experience of pain the same as yours? Are we talking
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about the same thing? There are two points to be
made here about beetles in medical education.
First, words change their meaning, and the com-
munity uses them in ways which reflect and reinforce
these changes—or the changes die out. Thus, En-
glish ‘gay’ seems unusable now in the sense of ‘light-
hearted’. ‘Square’ can no longer mean ‘unfashionable’,
as it did in the 1950s. Meaning is determined by
use. Studying changing meanings of words in med-
ical education can teach us a lot, as can be seen in
a study about perceptions of the ‘competent’ doctor
[20]. Kripke suggests that in using a sign (i.e. a word),
what matters is that the ‘community’ (in our case,
the medical education community) agree that I have
used it successfully [21]. Medical education consists of
different cultural and institutional communities, and
concepts that are being used in medical education
have often travelled from other scientific communi-
ties (medical science, psychology, humanities, social &
educational sciences). In their travels across individ-
uals, communities, and scientific disciplines, words
take on meanings and lose others [22]. This might
explain why a concept such as ‘emotion’ can take on
very different meanings [23].
Second, concepts associated with value are in prin-
ciple never well-defined. A plus sign in mathematics
is clearly defined: that is, the meaning assigned by
the community to the activity designated by the sym-
bol is well-defined. This is broadly true of a great
many medical terms, for parts of the body and names
of diseases, for example. There is no such agree-
ment—there can be no such agreement—about a term
like ‘empathy’, or ‘respect’ (for colleagues or patients,
for example). And beyond that, it seems clear that
‘empathy’ does not consist of a list of things to do. An
empathic person may behave in specific ways (cocks
their head, listens carefully, says ‘that must be very
hard for you’), but failure to do so could mean many
things. We might quickly infer a lack of empathy,
yet it could mean that this person does not know
how to demonstrate the value or attitude of ‘empa-
thy’ in a way that the community can understand, as
might be the case inmany young undergraduates. An-
other option is that this person has a different back-
ground to us, the perceivers, and we might not inter-
pret their behaviour as displaying a certain emotion
[24]. Equally, a cynical student may imitate empathic
behaviour in order to pass exams.
There is no causal relationship between the ‘real’
beetle, and the set of behaviours and markers that
might be seen as themanifestation of that beetle. Also,
being seen as demonstrating a value or attitude is not
evidence of actually possessing it. This means that
sometimes, for example empathic students are seen
as empathic (Fig.1, Area B), sometimes students who
do not actually experience empathy are indeed seen
as empathic (Area C), and sometimes students who
are not seen as empathic, actually are (Area A). The
catch is that while we know that the two circles prob-
Fig. 1 Venn diagram depicting what we can and cannot ob-
serve about students
ably overlap somewhere, we are unable to tell which
students fall into which area.
Assessing beetles—an impossible venture
The real difficulty with beetles in medical education
comes with testing. It is easy to teach and test aspects
of knowledge (‘knowing’) and skills (‘doing’). The stu-
dent learns, say, about first-line drugs for diabetes,
and can be given an MCQ about them. Or they prac-
tice taking blood pressure and are tested on how accu-
rately they can do it under exam conditions. Abstract
concepts (beetles), however, are typically linked to val-
ues, and in principle not susceptible to precise defi-
nition. There is in that sense no exact way of telling
a ‘right’ answer from a ‘wrong’ answer. But equally,
one cannot assess whether a doctor has good values
by asking them if it is okay to operate under the influ-
ence of alcohol. They are likely to know what answer
is required.
The risk is that, for testing purposes, a beetle is de-
fined in terms of what students must know or do. It is
reformulated as a behaviour, and indicators are spec-
ified so it becomes measurable. But when the beetle
is defined and tested only in terms of performance,
what we have elsewhere called the Zombie problem
[19] arises in two ways. First, as outside observers, we
cannot say if the behaviour is authentic or an act, such
as an actor might give. Second, in a system that views
behaviour in this way, students are rewarded for just
the behaviour, and there is no extrinsic motivation to
actually engage in meaningful beetle education. (As
has been pointed out [25], this is also a common theo-
logical argument. If wickedness—‘poor values’—were
always punished, the universe would lose its moral
purpose: we would all be cynically good).
So, for example, we want students to reflect. Sadly,
we can easily posit a ‘reflective zombie’ [19], a stu-
dent showing all the outer traits of a reflective person
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without having actually reflected. A student’s ability
to write a reflective essay in which knowledge of re-
flection models has been applied does not guarantee
actual reflection. It just means they are good at writing
a reflective essay: there is a box, a space in which re-
flection could take place, but we do not know if there
is a beetle in there, or if it contains anything at all.
The way we traditionally assess beetles is with the
model of representation. In this model, language and
action are seen as a representation of what is actu-
ally going on in people’s inner lives [26]. We recognize
that we cannot look directly inside students’ heads
and hearts. But what we can observe, the logic goes,
is their behaviour: if a student says ‘well that must be
hard for you’ to a patient in the right tone of voice
at the appropriate moment in the history taking part
of the medical interview, this observable behaviour
must be indicative of a feeling of empathy ‘inside’ the
student. We expect educators to interpret what a stu-
dent does and says, and we expect them to translate
this to a judgment of the student’s beetle—reflection,
empathy, professional behaviour, attitude, or what-
ever the animal is called. This representational model
has been criticized [1, 27, 28] but is still the dominant
model in medical education. We believe it is time to
leave this model behind, as we can never know what
public behaviour represents, or if it represents any-
thing at all. We can agree on the behavioural and
physical markers of what we think a beetle in a box
looks like, and we can ask people to self-report a score
of their own beetle—but that does not tell us anything
about the beetle itself.
The way forward
We have outlined the beetle-in-a-box thought experi-
ment, the representational approach to abstract con-
cepts in medical education, and the consequent diffi-
culties in attempting to measure beetles. If we accept
that beetles are private, then what does this mean for
the future of beetles in medical education? Is it ap-
propriate to have competencies that are impossible
to assess objectively? We will explore implications for
assessment, definition, and competency-based edu-
cation.
Assessment: respect the privacy of the beetle
Given the limits to what is possible to know, measure,
and assess, we challenge the reflex question that often
occurs when introducing a concept in the curriculum:
how will we assess this? We suggest educators ask
themselves three preceding questions when dealing
with educational developments:
1. ‘Do we want to assess this, and, if so, why?’ Does
the intended assessment truly contribute to compe-
tency development? This opens up the possibility
that there may be parts of the curriculum which are
important, but not beneficial or even harmful to as-
sess.
2. ‘Is it possible to assess this?’ If something cannot
be objectively measured, and we apply a form of as-
sessment anyway, then we need to think about what
is actually being assessed.
3. ‘Which aspect of this phenomenon do we assess,
and how?’ Here the assessment method should fit
what is being assessed.
In answering this last question, we think it is helpful
to consider subjective assessment.
Objective assessment of beetles is fundamentally
impossible, because it requires an external standard.
Standardization is not always possible: extrapolating,
for example, how a doctor performs in a real-world
environment from performance in a standardized test
is unwise [29, 30], because: ‘The real world is non-
standardized and haphazard, and, more importantly,
any attempt at standardization will only trivialize the
assessment’ [31].
As human beings, we form opinions and judgments
of each other all the time. Subjective assessment
means that the assessor’s experience is a necessary
part of the equation [30]. An educator might form an
idea of whether a student comes across as empathic
by being aware how their own beetle ‘resonates’ in
the conversation, using themselves as an instrument.
Or we might look at patient feedback and their ex-
perience of empathy in a (mock) consultation. We
are proposing a phenomenological approach to as-
sessment, which means that the experience of the
assessor, rather than an objective assessment, is the
criterion. This kind of assessment can be very useful,
as long as no pretences are made about the beetle
(e.g., ‘this person cannot reflect’, or ‘this person is not
empathic’). It also means that we have to accept that
different assessors can have different assessments of
the same person. This makes other forms of assess-
ment more logical, such as programmatic assessment
or holistic assessment [30].
This type of assessment requires teacher training,
as the assessment ‘instrument’ is the teacher’s expe-
rience. This kind of training would focus on being
aware of and reflecting on one’s limits as an assessor,
and being aware of always being biased. High-quality
educators will form high-quality judgments, as true
professionals will be reflective and aware of their own
subjectivity and potential bias.
Definitions: beetle-shaped holes
The contemporary focus on the whole person of the
future doctor, including their emotions [30], is wel-
come. However, any attempt to reach precise defini-
tions is misguided. Operationalizing these definitions
risks causing complex concepts to lose their essence.
Professionalism, for example, might become a tick-
box list of behaviours.
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Rather than seeing beetles as something to be de-
fined, we might see them as fuzzy concepts [2] that
travel between communities, take on certain mean-
ings, lose others, and leave room for individual inter-
pretation. ‘While groping to define, provisionally and
partly, what a particular concept may mean, we gain
insight into what it can do. It is in the groping that
the valuable work lies. [. . . ] Even those concepts that
are tenuously established [are valuable] primarily be-
cause of their potential intersubjectivity. Not because
they mean the same thing for everyone, but because
they don’t’ [22].
Just as students of sociology, say, have to work with
abstract concepts such as ‘capitalism’ or ‘anomie’
or ‘ascribed status’, so medical students will need
to learn to handle terms like ‘patient-centredness’,
‘teamwork’, and ‘reflection’. The only reason anyone
ever thought this was hard is because medical edu-
cation is perceived as involving science, and science
is about facts. The discussion of difficult concepts
is, however, routine in social sciences and humani-
ties. The aim is to deepen students’ understanding
of the concepts (after all, not many medical students
are articulate about ‘empathy’ on Day 1), and by ex-
tension help them to mount and sustain a rational
argument. The tradition here—it is to some extent
the tradition of learning itself—goes back, to Plato’s
Socratic Dialogues [32], which are absolutely centrally
concerned with the exploration of the abstract, and
the development of arguments. After all, one might
argue: if we do not want our doctors to be capable of
clear thought, why on earth not?
This is not easy, as in the medical education sys-
tem the aim is still to sort out what is ‘correct’ from
what is ‘incorrect’, to use evidence to decide on the
best course of action, and so on. In this tradition, ev-
ery concept is well-defined, and if it is not, it is not
a scientific concept and therefore not worth bothering
with, at least professionally. This means educational
developers, teachers, and students need to learn how
to deal with ambiguity. Social science and the hu-
manities have a lot to offer medical education in this
respect.
Competency frameworks: acknowledge the
limits
The central conundrum is simply stated. If the con-
dition for inclusion in the medical curriculum is that
something is objectivelymeasurable, then indeed bee-
tles have no place in the curriculum, and we should
focus only on knowledge and skills. Yet we know that
there are things (integrity, values, self-awareness, to
name but a few) which matter profoundly but which
cannot be clearly defined, let alone assessed.
Competency frameworks set out aspects of knowl-
edge and skills which can be measured. The act of
measurement under examination conditions, how-
ever, and we should be clear about this, is a mea-
surement of whether a doctor can perform to order.
But a surgeon who can undertake a procedure when
she/he is concentrating (their future is at stake) may
nevertheless not be bothered to deploy the same level
of care and concentration faced with an actual pa-
tient, at the end of a long shift, when they want to get
home. Similarly, most students can perform empathy
in an OSCE, face to face with a standardized patient:
but this does not make them empathic.
Assessment of beetles, or rather, assessments of
performances that we associate with beetles, requires
well-trained people if it is to be attempted at all. In-
dividuals with integrity, experience, self-awareness,
conscious of the risk of unconscious bias and so on,
and perhaps individuals with access to students on
the wards, interacting in a real clinical environment.
And as far as students are concerned, learning what
kind of ‘animals’ beetles are, and exploring the beetles
they personally carry with them, might require space
for students to reflect, explore and talk to peers and
mentors.
Assessment and measurement should not be goals
in themselves, but serve a higher purpose: training
doctors who can meet all the CanMeds roles. Assess-
ments can have educational value—people learn from
being assessed, learn from feedback, and from map-
ping their progress. But in many cases, assessment
can be counterproductive and guide students towards
superficial learning behaviour.
The essence of the beetle-in-a-box thought exper-
iment is that the beetle ‘itself’ cannot play any very
well-defined role in public language. Your concept of
‘honesty’ may be different from mine, even if we sus-
pect we know roughly what we are talking about. We
should, therefore, respect the privacy of the beetle.
One definition of privacy [33] is ‘the feature which
leaves each person’s experiences and thoughts as
known immediately to that person’ [34]. The beetle
analogy shows that we as educators have no imme-
diate access to those inner states. Only the students
themselves do.
Conclusion
Next to knowledge and skills, beetles-in-boxes play
an important part in medical education. Beetles are
private experiences that are inaccessible to the outer
world, but are an important part of the way individ-
uals experience the world and thus the way in which
they learn and develop. The problem with beetles is
that we treat them as skills and ask students to demon-
strate them (which is impossible), we try to measure
them (which is impossible), and thereby we stimu-
late superficial ‘zombie’ learning behaviour. We call
for medical educators to respect the privacy of private
experiences by not trying to see, measure, or assess
them. Rather than doing so, we propose to shift the
focus to the person holding the beetle, the medical
student. Beetles cannot be assessed, but the experi-
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ence of the assessor can be a valuable resource. Bee-
tles cannot be defined, but concepts that allow for di-
versity in meaning can be food for reflection, develop-
ment, and discussion. Together with knowledge and
skills, beetles-in-boxes are an essential part of compe-
tency frameworks—as long as we accept that no one
can look in anyone else’s box.
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